Accident Investigation In The Offshore Accident Prevention - Samples

Question: Discuss about the Accident Investigation In The Offshore Accident Prevention. Answer: Introduction Offshore oil extraction is one of the most dangerous job in the world. Workers that reside in the offshore oil rig drilling farms are constantly exposed to the hazardous environment of highly inflammable materials, heavy machinery and harsh weather. These hazardous working conditions often lead in to offshore accidents which result in to fatalities and serious injuries. The most common accidents that occur in an offshore oil rig platform are the explosion and fires. Welding, electrical work, and flammable materials are the common causes of fire in an offshore oil rig. Oil rig fires are difficult to contain and it might take hours or even days to fully extinguish the fire (Ismail et al. 2014). This study is based on the roles played by risk assessment and accident investigation in the offshore accident prevention. It also includes a comparative analysis of two major offshore oil rig accident. Role of risk assessment in the offshore major accident prevention Risk assessment provides an insight of the probable risks that may arise in future if precautionary step are not followed. The role of risk assessment is to find out the several factors that contribute to offshore oil rigs accidents, which are as follows: Flaws in the safety culture- safety norms governs the actions of an organization or a whole industry that has inherent risk associated with it. Safety culture can be attributed to the overall culture of an organization where safety culture is considered as a subset. This subsets reflects the general attitude of an organization towards therisk management and maintenance of safety. Operation that involve risk have an inherent chance of risk occurrence and thus risk assessments are conducted. Themanagement however remains unwilling to listen to any negative analysis and accidents occur when operational flaws are not addressed (Vinnem 2013). Improper implementation from the prior occurrences- accidents occur and even after a proper analysis of the incident, the necessary changes and modifications are not done to prevent its recurrence. Risk assessment here plays a major role in identification of such loop holes that contribute to oil rig accidents in future (Vinnem 2013). Accident investigation in offshore major accident prevention- The importance of accident investigation deeply lies in reducing the chances of recurring of the same incident again. Especially in offshore oil rigs a small mistake and negligence can lead to a disaster. Thus, the role of an accident investigation is to identify the human or the technical error that have led to an offshore oil accident (Xue et al. 2013). Piper Alpha (1988) Piper Alpha is an oil rig platform which was located in North Sea (Piper filed) of United Kingdom. This oil field is located northeast of Aberdeen which is approximately 120 miles. The platform was in 474 feet in water and was operated by a Californian based company called Occidental Petroleum (Cullen 1993). The platform was the United Kingdoms largest and was made up of 4 different modules. The platform used to pump natural gas and crude oil from the 24 different wells which was delivered to the Flotta oil terminal located in Orkney via three pipelines. Piper Alpha used to produce 250,000 barrels per day and later it increased to 300,000 barrels per day. However, it later declined to 125,000 barrels per day (Paik et al. 2011). On 6th July, 1988 work started on one condensate-injection pump (A) which were named as A and B. This was done to compress the gas and transport it to Flotta. From the compressor A, a pressure safety valve was opened for the purpose of recertification and recalibration. The dayshift crew ended work for that day. In the evening time, the second shift started the pump B and also decided to bring the pump A back to service (Cullen 1993). This led to gas leakage and the platform exploded and resulted in the death of 167 men which included a fast rescue craft and 2 operators. 62 men survived because they jumped into the sea from the burning platform (Broadribb 2015). Macondo Blowout (2010) In the year 2008, a company named BP leased a portion of the sea floor located in Gulf of Mexico and is 50 miles from the shores of Louisiana. The plot of the sea floor was named as Macondo. For the purpose of drilling company called Transocean was called. The drilling rig was 122 meter and 400 feet tall, while the drilling was bigger than a football field. On April 20th, 2010 under high pressure methane gas moved up through the drill column. The gas then expanded on the rig and got ignited and eventually exploded. Majority of the workers escaped the catastrophe, while 11 workers were reported to have died from the explosion. The Deepwater Horizon burnt for 36 hours and then it sank. This resulted in to an unpresented oil spill in to the Gulf of Mexico, a huge environmental disaster (Safina 2011). Performance of the safety barriers Safety barriers are the non-physical and the physical ways of planned or integrated in a system to control and prevent accidents and any undesired events. Safety barriers range from multiple technical system or human actions or the amalgamation of both are utilized for the prevention of any accident in offshore oil rigs. Here, the word prevention relies heavily on reduction of the occurrence of any risk (Landucci et al. 2015). Bottomhole Kickoff Assembly (BHKA) is an effective tool which is used to set cement plugs in to on horizontal holes and places which is highly deviated. This tools helps in setting competent and balanced cement plugs and reduces the hassle of adding additional plugs during oil drilling operations (Halliburton 2018). Piper Alpha- the safety barriers that did not function at Piper Alpha are: Communication, passive fire protection, fire protection system, evacuation facilities, delayed decision making, platform layout, permit to work system (Saleh and Pendley 2012). Macondo Blowout- When the blowout occurred, bottomhole cement was the only active barrier. When the mud got removed, an underbalance was created and the blowout preventer (BOP) was open. The BP Company decided not to put any additional barrier in place of the displaced barrier (mud) in the riser. The bottomhole cement turned in to foam which later became unstable and resulted in the accident. Human error occurred when the negative pressure was misinterpreted, and the operators failed to identify the influx during the displacement of the mud (Skogdalen, Utne and Vinnem 2011). Compare and contrast In both the accidents, the major causal factor that caused the accident is the human error. In both Piper alpha and Macondo blowout, the failure to convey the necessary and vital information to the respective responsible people. The major contrasting causal factor is the lack of communication during the shift change in Piper alpha. The dayshift workers ended the day without properly communicating that the pump A was under service, this led to the leakage of gas (Broadribb 2015). While in the Macondo case, a drill test was carried out in which the pressure buildup in to the pipes were not analyzed correctly and this led to an accident. This accident was later called as Macondo blowout (Safina 2011). Conclusion Thus, from the above discussion it can be concluded that, oil rig accidents were the result of mixed failure from both the humans and the safety barriers placed to counter any accident. The malfunction in both the cases occurred due to the errors in human judge and miscommunication. Thus, making both these crucial when operating in an oil rig platform. Accidents in oil rig platforms results in both loss of biodiversity and loss of billions of dollar of money. References BBC News, 2018. Piper Alpha: In their own words. [online] BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-22840445 [Accessed 12 Feb. 2018]. Broadribb, M.P., 2015. What have we really learned? Twenty five years after Piper Alpha. Process Safety Progress, 34(1), pp.16-23. Bryant, B., 2018. Deepwater Horizon and the Gulf oil spill - the key questions answered. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/20/deepwater-horizon-key-questions-answered [Accessed 12 Feb. 2018]. Cullen, L.W.D., 1993. The public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. Drilling Contractor;(United States), 49(4). Halliburton, 2018. [online] Halliburton.com. 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